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had been only substituted service on the defendant by serving
the Texas Secretary of State, in accordance with the statute.5
Although the final word in such cases must rest with the
United States Supreme Court, the Louisiana decision appears to
be correct and, in the event of such ultimate recourse, it should
be sustained.
Divorce
The case of Boudreaux v. Welch 6 contains a number of im-
portant issues but the Supreme Court decision appeared in time
for examination along with the opinion of the court of appeal,
and these were discussed in last year's symposium. 7
PUBLIC LAW
MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION
Leila Obier Cutshaw*
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Programs initiated by social legislation represent society's
attempt to ameliorate some evil affecting the public welfare.
The Employment Security Act is one such program, designed
to prevent economic insecurity due to unemployment "by en-
couraging employers to provide more stable employment and
by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of em-
ployment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus
maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social
consequences of poor relief assistance."' Particularly since these
funds are accumulated from the employer only and not the
employee, the courts perform a delicate job of balancing com-
peting interests when questions arise over an employee's right
to benefits from them.
The act provides the balance with the courts weighing the
facts against provisions of it. One disqualifies from benefits any
individual "for any week with respect to which the administrator
5. VERNON'S TEXAS CIVIL STATS., art. 2031b, sec. 4 (1964).
6. 249 La. 983, 192 So.2d 356 (1966), reversing 180 So.2d 725 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1965).
7. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-
Conflict of Laws, 27 LA. L. REV. 530-33 (1967).
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1. LA. R.S. 23:1471 (1950).
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finds that his unemployment is due to a labor dispute which is
in active progress at the factory, establishment, or other prem-
ises at which he is or was last employed; but such disqualifica-
tion shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the ad-
ministrator that he is not participating in or interested in the
labor dispute which caused his unemployment." 2 In Senegal v.
Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc.8 the Supreme Court refined the
meaning of "interested in" and distinguished it from "partici-
pation in" a labor dispute. In that case, the claimant for bene-
fits, a longshoreman, was governed by the rules and regulations
of the union, received the same wages as union members, and
received the increase in wages which union members received
as a result of a strike. Claimant was hired through the union
hall, turned over five per cent of his net earnings to the union,
and made no attempt to cross the picket line, although he took
no part in picketing during the strike. The claimant did not
receive strike benefits. Justice Hawthorne, speaking for the
court, said that the legislature intended "interested in" to have
a meaning different from and broader than "participating in";
otherwise the employer is in the position of subsidizing a strike.
Under the facts presented in Senegal the employee was "inter-
ested in" the labor dispute, and where a union shop exists it is
difficult to see that it could be otherwise since an employee's
wages and working conditions, certainly of vital interest, are
determined by the labor dispute. Although the court stated
that the question of "interest in" will be determined by the facts
and circumstances of each case, the employee, who has the
burden of proving that he comes within the exception to dis-
qualification, can rarely be even a passive onlooker to a labor
dispute and receive unemployment compensation benefits.
American Sugar Co. v. Brown4 presented a question which
is res nova in Louisiana, whether vacation or retirement pay
can be the equivalent of wages. In Brown certain employees
were laid off, and during their layoff the employer's refinery
was extensively damaged by fire and explosion. The employer
offered the eligible employees vacation or retirement prepara-
tion pay, which they accepted. On appeal by the employer, the
court determined that these employees were not eligible for
unemployment compensation benefits for the entire layoff
period. During the weeks in which the vacation or retirement
2. LA. R.S. 23:1601(4) (1950).
3. 250 La. 623, 197 So.2d 648 (1967).
4. 193 So.2d 326 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
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pay was received, the employees were not deprived of wages
or its equivalent.5
Another novel question was presented in Cotright v. Doyals
where the claimant gave her employer notice that she was leav-
ing employment as a salad girl to move to California but three
days later told him she was not leaving because of the illness
of a relative. The employer had already hired a replacement.
With no precedent in Louisiana, the court reviewed the cases
elsewhere and took the liberal position that "by retracting her
notice of leaving, . . . and remaining available and desiring to
continue her employment we opine that her status was as one
who did not voluntarily become unemployed, or stated some-
what differently, she never left her job until so directed by her
employer.17 As remedial legislation, the Employment Security
Act should be interpreted so as to extend its benefits as far as
possible within bounds imposed by the expressed legislative
restrictions." This the court did in the instant case, determining
that economic security for the employee who had not volun-
tarily abandoned her employment was, on balance, in the public
interest.
CORPORATIONS
Leila Obier Cutshaw*
Statutes restricting the inspection of corporate books and
records represent an attempt to balance the right of the indi-
vidual shareholder as part owner of the corporation to inspect
the books against the rights of other shareholders that informa-
tion gleaned from them will not be used to the detriment of the
corporation. In qualifying this right to information so as to
protect the corporation and other shareholders, the Louisiana
Business Corporation Act requires both a specified duration of
shareholding and a specified percentage of share ownership for
exercise of the inspection right.1 Inspection rights are usually
5. In an earlier case, George v. Brown, 144 So.2d 140 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962), the Fourth Circuit held that termination pay received by a claimant,
equal to 17 weeks pay, did not constitute wages, so that the claimant was
eligible for benefits. Perhaps the distinguishing feature of the two is that
on receipt of termination pay the employee is free to seek other employment.
6. 195 So.2d 176 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).
7. Id. at 179.
8. Jackson v. Administrator of Division of Employment Sec. of Dept.
of Labor, 128 So.2d 915 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
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1. LA. R.S. 12:38 (1950). Louisiana is one of three states requiring both
